The End of the Age of America? The Middle East After America!

The End of the Age of America?
The Middle East After America!
The Middle East – like other regions in the world – has gone through eras
of projection of influence by external powers, adapting to the balance of
power between them. This was the case during the age of colonialism
(predominance of Britain and France), the Cold War (competition between
the US and the USSR) and the period since the end of the Cold War,
during which the US became the sole superpower in the region.
The passage from one era to another, however, is never clearly demarcated
and the process of adaptation does not begin only when a new era has been
“declared”. Thus, years before the fall of the Soviet Union, countries began
to hedge their relations with the two Superpowers, reflecting their
anticipations of the future status of the “power market”. Today, the Middle
East and other regions of the world are in the throes of a re-alignment
which is primarily a response to American policies and actions and reflects
the expectation of a power void which will be left with the end of the “Age
of America”. The re-alignment of the Middle East will have a profound
influence on other theatres and on the domestic and economic interests of
the United States and the rest of the West.
The Strategic Weltanschauung
of the Obama Administration
The American Middle Eastern policy under the Obama administration aims first
and foremost at reducing American projection of “hard power”, particularly in the
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Middle East, as part of a fundamental change in US foreign and defense policies.
The new American policy has already found its way into six major policy
documents issued issued during the administration’s first year - between
February 1 and May 29, 2010:
(1) the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR); (2) the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review Report (BMDR) both issued on February 1st; (3) the Nuclear
Posture Review Report (NPR), issued on April 6th; (4) the New START Treaty
signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian
Federation (Prague, April 8th); (5) the Washington Nuclear Summit Conference
declaration (on April 12th); (6) and the National Security Strategy for 2010,
issued on May 29th.
Together, these documents present a comprehensive description of the
underlying beliefs held by the administration about how the world works, what
threats and potential threats need to be addressed, and how best to address them.
The publication of this number of strategic policy documents in such a short time
period and in such an early stage of the administration is unprecedented. The
documents reflect the world view with which the administration came to office
more than an attempt to interpret the events of its first year in office. They reflect
a strategic assessment based on the supposition that America has engaged in
strategic overreach. They conclude that the solution is a fundamental change in
America’s strategic profile. They also reflect an assumption in international
affairs of the inherent rationality of all parties that can facilitate conflict
resolution through dialogue; a rejection of confrontation, projection of hard
power and unilateralism (all of which are seen as having characterized the Bush
administration); and an aversion to American exceptionalism and export of
values on one hand, and a belief in the intrinsic “rightness” of engagement,
consensus and “communities of interests” as a means to solve international
conflicts and, on the other hand.
This worldview contradicts in many of its elements key perceptions of the world
held by America’s allies in the Middle East (and even in the world at large) and
creates a gap in the threat perception between the US and those countries.
It has several key elements:
1. The NPR views acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists (or
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alternatively the breakdown of a nuclear state which could result in transfer of
nuclear weapons to sub-states) as the primary threat to the entire international
community, but one that can be best contained by multilateral cooperation on
technical measures such as better safeguards, isotope ID and others.
2. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue states and subsequent
regional proliferation among other countries (including but not only in the
Middle East) is relegated to the status of a challenge that can be contained by
traditional cold war deterrence. This position drives the administration’s interest
in a dialogue with rogue states that are open proliferators to states in order to
ensure that they do not proliferate to terrorists as well.
3. An equation between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear North Korea, ignoring
the different motivations and strategic environments of the two countries1
1 The NPR refers to the two proliferation challenges as follows:
“As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear
terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they
would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them.” Whereas al-Qaeda is assumed to be
willing to use such weapons, the reference to proliferation of nuclear weapons among states does
not make that assumption: "Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional
countries – especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader
international community – may acquire nuclear weapons. …North Korea and Iran have violated
non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued
missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means
the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions
and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of
their own. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries
would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security
implications for the United States and the international community."
. In
doing so, it suggests that further proliferation in the Middle East in the wake of
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran can be contained as was the case in East
Asia.
4. The adoption of the thesis that a declared policy of general nuclear
disarmament will reduce the motivation of rogue states to acquire nuclear
weapons of their own. This thesis implicitly accepts the “third world” claim that
the key motivation for the drive of those states for nuclear weapons is the
stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the hands of the veteran nuclear powers and
ignores the local strategic and cultural motivations.
5. The assumption that extended assurances will suffice to stem the tide of
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nuclear proliferation or will even be feasible in a scenario in which Iran will have
become a nuclear power. This assumption ignores the damage that such a
scenario will have on American credibility in the region.
6. The downplaying of the possibility that such new nuclear states in the
region may actually use their nuclear weapons or that deterrence may fail in an
escalating crisis situation. The administration clearly does not accept the view
that inherent political, cultural and religious features of the region raise the risk
of nuclear confrontation due to escalation in the Middle East in comparison to
other nuclear “neighborhoods” (the Indian sub-continent, Europe during the
Cold War and East Asia.
7. The emphasis of multi-lateral action by the international community and
“isolation” of offenders of the world order as the ultimate punishment. The
concept underlying this assumption is that all nations accord a high value to their
international legitimacy. Experience with Cuba, North Korea, Iraq and Iran does
not seem to bear this thesis out.
8. The downgrading of the war against radical Islamist ideology to one
against “a specific network – al-Qaida and its affiliates who support efforts to
attack the United States, our allies and our partners” and disregard of the
strength of the radical Islamist ideology in the Muslim street and the broad
support that the terrorist organizations succeed in gathering.
These principles have been put to the test during the first half of the Obama
administration and have been found wanting. Engagement has not succeeded in
bringing Iran or North Korea to cease their nuclear programs, nor has it
mitigated the bellicosity of the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and its successes visà-
vis Russia and China have also been limited. This is, first and foremost, due to
the perception that America is indeed “speaking softly” and carrying “a big stick”,
but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield it if and
when push comes to shove.
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Real Power vs. Perceived Power
The actual power of a nation is something that only the leadership of that nation
can really know. The probability that that leadership will actually employ that
power in given circumstances is a question which cannot be answered even by
that leadership, as it will depend on circumstances – political and psychological –
at that time. Therefore, projection of power does not correspond precisely to real
power; it is measured in terms of the perception by friend and foe alike of that
nation’s power, resolution and willpower. The perception of American power has
long been a central component in the security of America’s allies around the
world. Hence, decline in the perception by US allies of American
willingness/capacity to project power holds strategic implications for the security
of America’s allies.
While this is true in all theatres – from Central Europe to South American and
East Asia, it is particularly acute in the Middle East, where American resolve and
projection of power have been put to the test in recent years. Local expectations
and opinions as to what the US course of action will be, and not only the actual
American choice of action, will have a far reaching influence on the behavior of
local actors. The expectations of countries in the region and the messages that
Washington sends – intentionally or unintentionally – will determine the
readiness of its Arab allies to still rely upon it against the growing Iranian threat.
Ostensibly, the real strength of the United States has not declined. American
military power has proven itself in the last decade in simultaneous involvement in
two major wars and numerous other interventions. Objectively, the US has the
strongest military in the world. America's broader economic, financial, social and
technological strength also remains robust.
Despite all of these dimensions of American power, there is a growing perception
of the decline of American power. In the Middle East, this perception is
based on the conventional wisdom in the region that the US will disengage from
Iraq, leaving it to Iranian predominance, will engage the Taliban both in
Afghanistan and Pakistan; will not act with resolution to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons (and will even try to prevent Israel from acting) and
will even attempt to reach a “modus vivendi” with Iran as a regional hegemon.
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In Asia (particularly China) and in South America (Venezuela and Brazil) there is
a growing perception of America as a declining giant, hollowed out of its essential
source of power, which is economic, unable to respond to market challenges.
American Regional Policy
US involvement in the Middle East and the driving force behind most American
initiatives in the region since the 1930’s have traditionally stemmed from the
need to acquire and maintain access to vital economic interests – first and
foremost among them – energy resources. The underlying assumptions of this
strategic worldview were that:
• The US economy is the bedrock of all American power. Hence, a
constraint on US economic activity is at heart, an attack on the US, both
hard and soft.
• Unrestrained access to energy sources is essential to the growth and
prosperity of the American economy.
• Middle Eastern oil (and possibly central Asian gas) is essential to
maintaining sufficient energy sources.
• More recently - the image of the Saudi and Gulf states as “bank vaults” for
dollars, available for investment at short notice. This is a growing
consideration in the light of the decline of the European economy and of
Europe as an actor in the American economy and the competition with
China for the Asian market.
With the possible exception of the invasion of Iraq (regarding which there is a
debate about the motivation of the administration), the option of American
military intervention has been raised over the years only in the face of a direct
attack or clear and imminent danger to those interests.
Ostensibly, the threat to US vital interests posed by the anticipated denial of
economic interests and access to energy by a nuclear Iran or the breakdown of the
conservative pro-American regimes in the region and there replacement with
Islamist governments should be viewed as severe.
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This, however, will not be so if the administration believes that the threats to the
United States can be mitigated by pre-emptive engagement with the forces (Iran
and fundamentalist Islam) that are on an inevitable course to gaining power in
the region. In practice, US policy in the Middle East focuses on five key interrelated
issues –some of them anchored in specific geographical areas, and some
with trans-national implications: (1) Iraq (with the implications for future Sunni-
Shiite relations in the region and for Iranian and Jihadi influences); (2)
Afghanistan (with implications for Pakistan and potential for nuclear
proliferation); (3) Iran (with implications for possible nuclearization of the
Middle East); (4) al-Qa'ida and (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process.
Iraq
The primary aim of American foreign policy in Iraq is to end the war, withdraw
US forces and hand the security of the new nation over to Iraqi military forces,
based on President Obama's February 27, 2009 declaration on his intention to
bring the war to a conclusion following a "responsible drawdown" of American
troops from this country. On the security level, this aim may be achievable. The
Iraq of today is quite different than the Iraq of 2006-2007. The insurgency in
Iraq continues to decline and at current levels it does not pose a major threat to
the stability of the Iraqi government. While al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni
extremists continue their attacks, they have thus far failed to provoke the type of
tit for tat retributive cycle of violence, of revenge killings that used to take place.
Hence, with or without a large American presence, a return to the sectarian strife
of the years 2006-2007 seems unlikely: the Sunni terrorist networks have been
devastated (for the time being); the Shiite militant groups have for the most part
moved into the political process; and the Iraqi security forces are much more
numerous and capable today.
On the other hand, six months after the March elections, the Iraqi parties have
not succeeded in forming a new national government. This is primarily due to
Iranian intervention. Tehran has a vested interest in keeping Iraq in a status of
limbo until after the first stage of American withdrawal and has succeeded in
doing so. The sense of growing Iranian influence and declining American
presence feeds the willingness of the Shiite parties to take the Iranian position
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into account. Another important long-term political challenge to political stability
in Iraq is embodied in Arab-Kurd tensions over Kirkuk and other disputed
territories, oil revenues and the balance of power between the central government
and the Kurdistan regional government. These tensions could lead to a wider
conflict. Here too, in the light of the waning of the waning of American influence,
both sides are turning to Iran and the neighboring Arab states (and Turkey) for
support.
The fact that the US itself is not averse to engaging Iran in order to guarantee an
orderly withdrawal process raises concerns in the region of a "grand bargain"
based on an Iranian commitment to cooperate in Iraq (and Afghanistan) in return
for a softening of the American position on the nuclear issue. Whether or not
such a bargain is being contemplated by the administration already does not
change the perception in the region that it is likely, and the influence of such an
assessment on the positions of the countries of the region. The Sunni countries
surrounding Iraq are already developing their own areas of influence and
nurturing relationships with groups inside Iraq. Today there are already close ties
between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, and between the Turks and Shiite delegates
such as Muqtada al-Sadr and others. The US may encourage this trend as a
preferable alternative to Iranian influence. Iraq, after the American withdrawal,
will become a microcosm of regional struggles at the expense of both Iraqi and
wider American interests.
Afghanistan
The Afghani surge declared by President Obama (November 2009) will not
achieve the success of the surge in Iraq. This is due to basic differences between
the two theatres. However, by declaring that the American troops will start their
drawdown from Afghanistan in mid-2011, the administration has sent a message
to all the actors in the theatre that the present military effort is temporary and if
they can ride it out, the American agenda will eventually fizzle. The US military
has already recognized the futility of achieving the administration’s goals and
recommended a shift in focus from nation-building to simply destroying al-Qaida
forces in Afghanistan and creating areas of stability under the central government
in lieu of extending Kabul’s sway over the entire country.
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The US may decide to forego the goal of pacifying the entire territory of
Afghanistan and to attempt to stabilize only areas controlled by the central
government in order to reduce terrorist attacks in these areas. Naturally, this will
be perceived by the administration as an accomplishment. However, a rise in
American casualties could cause a shift in American public opinion, which still
sees the Afghanistan war as a "just war" against terrorism, as opposed to Iraq
which was the "wrong war". Such a shift, bringing public opinion to perceive it as
a second "Vietnam War" may bring the administration to look for a way to "cut
losses" and to initiate an even earlier withdrawal, or alternatively, to invest
further resources in order to achieve an image of success.
The price of an American “cut and run” strategy in Afghanistan may be high. A
resurgence of Taliban influence in Afghanistan will surely revive the Pakistani
Taliban and further weaken the regime in Islamabad. A failed nuclear state of
Pakistan will have dire consequences for the proliferation regime, nuclearization
of the Middle East and the potential transformation of Pakistan and Afghanistan
together into a staging ground for Jihadist attacks against the West.
The Iranian Challenge
Probably the greatest contributor to the perception of the decline in America’s
resolve to support its allies in the Middle East – or alternatively the perception of
a conspiratorial undeclared shift in American policy from support of those allies –
has been the policy of the Obama administration towards Iran. Seemingly
unambiguous statements of non-acceptance of Iran’s nuclear aspirations
(“unacceptable”, “all options are on the table”) have given way to a perception
that the US has already reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran (at best) or even is
realigning its interest in the region to accommodate Iranian predominance. The
outcome of the administration’s engagement policy to date has been to encourage
Iran to take more strident and provocative moves towards a nuclear capability.
The sanctions regime creates an illusion of action in consensus, but few truly
believe that it will achieve the necessary effect.
The case for continuing this policy is primarily the absence of alternatives and
particularly the potential consequences of an Iranian retaliation to a military
strike. The argument against military action (or even threat of military action) is
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based on the assessment that such action will be met with a broad Iranian
response that will be catastrophic for the region, generate upheavals in moderate
states, ignite a war between Iran and the Gulf States, cause a steep rise in energy
prices, endanger American troops in Iran and Afghanistan and give the Iranian
regime the opportunity to make short thrift of the “Green Revolution” opposition.
This assessment is applied by the administration also to the implications of an
Israeli strike. The administration is aware of the consensus among the political
leadership in Israel that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that it would lead to a
long list of negative outcomes: the end of the Peace Process; undermining the
stability of moderate regimes and strengthening Hezbollah and Hamas.
Ostensibly, a credible Israeli threat against Iran would serve the US as pressure
against Iran. However, the administration fears that even the perception of US
support for Israeli action would lead to severe reactions in the Muslim world,
would damage friendly regimes and inspire terrorist activities against the US.
This apocalyptic assessment regarding Iranian reactions to a military strike is fed
by various circles in Washington and is deeply flawed. The Iranian military
capability to close the Straits of Hormuz or to attack American interests in the
Gulf is limited. So is the Iranian subversive and terrorist capacity to ignite the
Sunni Arab world in response to an attack on its nuclear project (deeply feared by
the Sunni world). However, there is little or no challenge within the US
administration to these assumptions, which continue to determine the limits of
US policy towards Iran.
Internal events in Iran are also conjured by the administration as a kind of a
potential “deus ex machina” for solving the issue without violence. This is based
on the belief that regime change in Iran would bring about suspension of the
nuclear program or even its complete dismantling. Some observers argue that the
Iranian regime will change or the Green Movement will take over in a year or two
and therefore, the best way to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat is to wait.
These argue that although the changing of the regime in Iran will probably not
bring about a liberal democracy, there might be a rise to power of “religious
democrats” who have an interest in restoring Iran’s international legitimacy and
would prefer good relations with the West over perseverance with the nuclear
program.
A major source of differences between the United States and its allies in the
region is in the definition of the “nuclear Iran” which must be prevented: is it Iran
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with a nuclear bomb which has done a test? Is it Iran with a bomb in a basement?
Is it Iran with enough for one bomb and a proven capability for one bomb? Or is
it an Iran with stockpiles of enriched uranium for a large amount of weapons and
half a year away from breakout or sneak-out? It seems (though there is no formal
definition by the administration on this issue) that the American definition is the
first – an Iran which has completed weaponization and testing of a weapon. For
most of the countries in the Middle East, both Israel and the Arab countries,
stockpiles alone would be seen as an Iran which has already crossed the nuclear
threshold, de facto.
The administration also seems to believe that Iran does not really intend to break
out with a military nuclear capability but will suffice with being a “threshold
nuclear power” along the lines of the Japanese model. This assessment leads it to
redefine its objectives regarding the Iranian threat: from the complete prevention
of a "nuclear" Iran to the acceptance of Iran as a nuclear threshold state, while
convincing Tehran not to cross the threshold.
This assessment though does not seem to hold water. There is broad anticipation
in the region that Iran will not stop at a threshold status and the states of the
region will be driven by this assessment and not by an optimistic American
attitude. The basis for this assessment is the belief that Iran cannot achieve its
goals in the region just by announcing such a status. These goals – driving the US
out of the Gulf, imposing hegemony on the countries of the Gulf, having
immunity for subversive action – can only be achieved by actually having a
weapon capability. The "threshold assumption" may have fit the Iranian policy a
few years back. Today, given the present balance of power between the more
circumspect “old guard” and the IRGC leadership, the possibility of a policy of
reaching the threshold and staying there is highly unlikely.
Al-Qaeda
A leitmotif that has characterized the Obama administration has been outreach to
the Muslim world. President Obama came to office at a time when relations
between the US and the Muslim world had reached a nadir and he saw himself as
particularly suited – as one who was brought up as a Muslim and lived in a
Muslim country - to rectify them. As part of this policy, the administration refuses
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to acknowledge any link between Islam and the phenomenon of Jihadi terrorism
(to the extent that the administration refuses to use the terminology of “Jihadist”
on the grounds that “Jihad” in Islam is a personal moral struggle) and presents
the latter as an aberration with no real link to “true Islam” - individual acts of
personal violence and not part of a wider phenomenon.
Furthermore, the engagement policy also dictates outreach not only to bone fide
moderates and mainstream Muslims, but also to the Muslim Brotherhood and its
affiliates and “moderate” Taleban elements on the Sunni side and Lebanese
Hezbollah and Iraqi proxies of Iran on the Shiite side. The rationale for such
engagement is rooted in (1) a tacit belief that these parties are not irrevocably
anti-American but respond to America’s actions, policies and rejection of
dialogue with them; (2) belief that preemptive engagement of these movements
will neutralize their radicalism and anti-western positions; (3) and unwillingness
to invest the necessary soft and hard power in order to perpetuate the “old guard”
of pro-American regimes in the region.
The insistence on ignoring the religious motivation and broader religious
legitimacy of the Jihadi phenomenon is very much out of sync with the concerns
of the pro-American Muslim regimes which see the main problem in that very
legitimacy. The strategy of using sanitized terminology as a means to woo the
radicals from their fundamental religious, cultural and political hostility to the
values that America represents (at least in their eyes) will ultimately fail.
Relations with Israel and the
Israeli-Arab Peace Process
The key area in which the administration sees a need to project active
involvement in the region is the Israeli-Arab Peace Process. The administration
has, in essence, accepted the claim that the “Palestinian problem” and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict are the “core issue” of the Middle East and the key cause of
instability in the region and that this conflict could be solved were it not for
Israel’s obstinacy. The efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – and
possibly Israeli-Syrian talks in the future - and the willingness to risk
confrontation and crisis with Israel is seen by the Obama administration as a
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means to garner Arab and Muslim sympathy. The result is an American policy
vis-à-vis the peace process which is more Palestinian than that of the
Palestinians. Washington demanded a total cessation of settlement activity,
including in East Jerusalem when the Palestinian leadership itself did not, and
joined the demand that Israel subscribe to the NPT. The voices heard from those
close to the administration charging Israel, the Jewish lobby and even Jewish
figures within government with subversion of strategic American interests in the
region in favor of Israeli interests both reflect the true opinion of those
individuals and serve as a lever for restraining Israel. The presentation of a
fundamental conflict of interests between the US and Israel in regards to Iran
exacerbates this narrative.
The efforts of the administration to distance itself from Israel and to present an
“even-handed” or even pro-Palestinian stance, however, have not significantly
improved the chances of a peace settlement. The decline in the perception of
American power was evident in the long refusal of the Palestinian leadership to
American requests to renew direct negotiations. As American presence in the
region wanes, the Palestinians and the Arab regimes will have to take into
account growing domestic radicalization as a severe constraint against moving
forward in the peace process.
By distancing itself from Israel and by lowering its profile in the Middle East in
general, however, the administration also distances itself from influence on the
peace process. The image of American power in the region is an important
component of Israel's own deterrent image. This is expressed in the very image of
American capacity to act in the region to support its allies and in the assumption
of a strategic alliance and special relationship between the US and Israel. The
erosion of the image of American power is not due to the perception of American
capabilities per se, but to the perception of willingness of the US to act in the
region to support its allies, buttressed by a perceived decline in US economic preeminence.
Erosion of the image of support for allies in general and for Israel in
particular, will have a detrimental effect on Israel's deterrence. The erosion of
Israel’s deterrence will have, in turn, a detrimental effect on that of the United
States.
The Obama administration – backed up by parts of the US military establishment
– views Israeli military action against Iran as fraught with negative consequences
for American interests. Paradoxically, this view contradicts the expressed interest
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of many of America’s Arab allies in an immediate (and military) solution to the
Iranian nuclear program. Whether such action – if it takes place – will achieve its
goals or not and whether the doomsday scenarios of Iranian responses will take
place or not, an Israeli attack will certainly be exploited by the administration to
create a crisis with Israel in order to demonstrate non-complicity in the attack.
Implications for the
Strategic Position of the US
The perception in the Middle East of a future “de-Americanized” region is not
baseless. The United States will most probably pull out of Iraq by the end of 2011,
leaving Iran to play a pivotal role of power-broker. Until then, the US will be
constrained by its Iraqi agenda to refrain from any serious crisis with Iran, lest it
retaliate in the Iraqi theatre. In the AFPAK theatre, without (the unlikely)
investment of sufficient additional resources, the US will not achieve strategic
defeat of the Taliban and their supporters, nor will the current level of military
intervention or efforts to reach agreements with parts of the Taliban achieve the
elimination of al-Qaida in Afghanistan. There are grounds for the scenario that
continued American military engagement in Afghanistan without any real
resolution on the horizon (especially if the number of American casualties rises)
may change American public opinion about this war. The war with the Taliban
has already spilled over to Pakistan. However, while the US must rely on Pakistan
in the war against al-Qaida, there exists a real possibility that the Taliban will
broaden their "sphere of influence" in Pakistan, both geographically and
institutionally in the Pakistani religious establishment, and even within the
regime itself. Such a development would affect the stability of this country and its
willingness to cooperate with the US and signal the decline of American power in
yet another area. From the point of view of the Sunni Arab states, US policy in
Iraq, allowing Iran a foothold in that country, acceptance of Hezbollah
predominance in Lebanon and overtures towards the (relatively pro-Iranian)
Muslim Brotherhood movement all indicate that the US sees Iran as the future
power in the region.
The future of American interests in the Middle East– and the interests of
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America’s allies in the region - hinge primarily on the outcome of the efforts to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear status. If Iran is perceived as having
crossed the nuclear threshold it will have "won" against the pressures of the
international community. It will become a model for radical movements
throughout the Muslim world and will be on its way to achieving its desired
hegemony in the region. As long as this threshold has not been crossed the US
government can claim success of its engagement policy – at least as a holding
tactic. Delaying Iran’s crossing the threshold however does not delay the process
of decline in the willingness to rely on the United States. The cumulative
impression of American reluctance to confront Iran out of fear of Iranian reprisal
exacerbates the concerns in the region that the pro-Western countries will not be
able to rely, when the chips are down, on the United States.
Failure to prevent Iran from nearing the nuclear threshold will certainly intensify
the drive of other states in the region for nuclear weapons. The increased demand
for nuclear materials and know-how will probably induce increased supply. The
prime suppliers of these will be Pakistan and North Korea – two nuclear nations
which may become failed states on short notice. The possibility of a “melt-down”
in these countries may bring the elements responsible for the nuclear program to
enter the market. Increased demand would probably bring Chinese and Russian
companies back into the market. Increased supply will most likely induce
additional demand, with countries in the Middle East and other regions speeding
up their nucler programs to take advantage of the market. The assumption in
Washington that American promises of extended deterrence will stem the tide of
proliferation to other countries, as it did in East Asia ignores the damage that the
credibility of such guarantees will have sustained after the US has failed to
prevent Iran from going nuclear. The willingness of the regional parties to rely on
American assurances has already declined and will decline further once Iran
achieves even a nascent nuclear status. It is doubtful that the US will be able to
provide the high profile military deployment necessary to back up such
assurances Difficulties will come both from domestic American considerations
and from domestic pressures in the region, with America’s allies facing Iranianfed
and Islamist opposition to close security relations with the US.
The administration may attempt to balance the perception of having abandoned
its Arab allies by selling them advanced weapons – a step already initiated vis-àvis
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some of the Gulf States – and by the argument that
the withdrawal from Iraq, and eventually from Afghanistan will ultimately
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya)
16
enhance America's operational flexibility and hence its deterrence vis-à-vis Iran.
However it is not likely that the conservative Arab regimes will be satisfied by
such a claim and it is unlikely that reinforcement of their strategic capabilities
will provide them with the level of confidence they would need to challenge
Iranian aspirations. In any case, the Sunni Arab states would probably demand –
at least for domestic reasons - that American promises of extended deterrence
include guarantees against Israel and efforts to disarm Israel as well as Iran.
Thus, certain steps that may be taken by the administration to counter-balance
the decline in American projection of power may have an adverse effect on
Israel’s deterrence posture.
The strategic – indeed historic - implications of a nuclear Iran should ostensibly
galvanize the countries of the region into action. However, in light of the
perception that the United States is withdrawing from the region, many of the
regimes therein are already accommodating themselves to the new
“neighborhood strongman”. This is evident in the behavior of Qatar, Oman and
even Saudi Arabia itself. Iran will probably take advantage of this period of Arab
strategic inferiority to cement its hegemony in the region. A prime example may
be by renewing its call for “leaving the security of the Gulf in the hands of the Gulf
countries themselves” - a euphemism for Iranian hegemony without American or
British presence. In this demand, Iran will be able to leverage the fact that the
very failure of the US to prevent Iran from going nuclear and the regional image
of the Obama administration as conciliatory towards Iran will diminish any faith
that the countries of the region may have in American guarantees. The Iranian
ability to employ subversion will also make it difficult for those regimes to
continue to rely on the “infidel” to defend them against (Muslim) Iran. Other
consequences will be felt in the heart of the Middle East; the chances of weaning
Syria out of the Iranian orbit and promoting stability in Lebanon, where Iran’s
surrogate – Hezbollah – has already become the key power broker will become
even slimmer. Hamas, Iran's Palestinian proxy will feel that it has a longer leash.
The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be willing to take bold steps
towards a peace agreement with Israel will also wane.
For the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia, which was born as an anti-Shiite
movement, Iranian (i.e. Shiite) hegemony is a nightmare come true. At the same
time, secular conservative Arab regimes such as Egypt and Jordan fear that the
US is in the process of shifting its support from the "old guards" in the region to
oppositional popular forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The growing
Friends of Israel Initiative
The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America
Dr. Shmuel Bar (Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya)
17
anxiety in the Gulf States from a "Shiite threat" due to the prospects of a nuclear
Iran and increasing Shiite (Iranian) influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could
lead to enhanced strategic collaboration between these regimes and radical
Islamic elements on the basis of an anti-Shiite "platform", common to both
parties. However, these regimes will not be able to compel the radical
organizations they sponsor to restrict their militant activities solely to Shiite and
Iranian targets and to avoid action against the Western "infidel" and Israel.
These trends are not irreversible. Events in the region may impose on the
administration a change of policy and return to a higher level of involvement in
the region. Some possible scenarios and events may cause change and
reassessment in US regional policy: regime change (or even succession within
regimes that will bring younger, more radical and inexperienced leaders to the
helm) in key states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt); domestic developments in
Iraq and Afghanistan that could undermine plans for redeployment and
withdrawal of the US from those countries; deterioration of the internal situation
in Pakistan; significant progress in the Iranian nuclear program; the future of
Yemen as a base of al-Qaida in the region, and major terrorist attacks originating
in one of the countries of the region. US policy towards the Middle East may also
be overturned by developments in the relations with Russia, China and North
Korea.
Politics – like nature – abhors a vacuum. The conscious disengagement of the
United States from the role it played since the mid-1970’s as leading power in the
Middle East will open the door wide for other players – local ones like Iran that
will seek regional hegemony and global ones like Russia and China. The United
States can still reverse the trend by re-drawing its lines in the sand and reevaluating
of global re-positioning.
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